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Abstract: The transmission process from policy-controlled interest rates to bank lending
rates deserves reconsideration owing to the implementation of the European Monetary
Union (EMU) in 1999. Additional attention to the subject in Austria is due to several
large banks which, in 2002, have been charged for not passing on interest rate decreases
to their customers. I examine dynamic responses of commercial credit rates to changes
in key policy rates and money market rates. Using Austrian data from 1995 to 2002, I
show that strength and speed of interest rate transmission depend on whether rates go up
or down. With the EMU, asymmetry in interest rate transmission partly declined. The
speed of transmission and the relative importance of policy and money market rates for
commercial credit rates also were aﬀected.
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Banks’ decisions about the yields paid on their assets and liabilities have an impact on the
expenditure and investment behavior of deposit holders and borrowers and thus on real
economic activity (De Bondt, 2002). So the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy is also about
the extent and the speed of retail banks’ interest rates adjustment to changes in policy-
controlled interest rates. Bank lending rates to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms are a key indicator of
the cost of short-term external funding in an economy (Borio and Fritz, 1995).
Retail banks may react quickly or slowly to a change in policy-controlled rates.
Toolsema et al. (2001) discussed the relevance of asymmetric information, adjustment
and switching costs, as well as risk sharing in expaining sluggish responses of bank lending
rates. Empirically, the interest rate channel of monetary transmission also has received
renewed attention. Diﬀerent kinds of data and methodologies have been applied, and
most authors agree on the following results:
² There is considerable stickiness of retail lending rates in the short term. At the
European level, for example, the proportion of a given market interest rate change
that is passed on to short-term commercial lending rates within one month is around
30 % (De Bondt, 2002).
² There are remarkable cross-country diﬀerences with respect to the stickiness of the
short-term lending rate. It depends on the stage of ﬁnancial market development, the
degree of ﬁnancial market openness as well as concentration and competition within
the banking sector (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994). In Europe, these asymmetries
are expected to diminish as integration increases (Mojon, 2000).
² The average speed for retail bank interest rates to fully adjust to market interest rate
changes is typically between 3 and 10 months (De Bondt, 2002). The perception
that the implementation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) will speed up the
pass-through is expressed e.g. by Mojon (2000).
² The ﬁnal pass-through of market to retail bank interest rates is typically complete
or even well above 100 %, as in the case of loans to enterprises of up to one year.
Overshooting may, among other factors, be explained by asymmetric information
costs without credit rationing. If banks increase their lending rates exactly one-
for-one with market interest rates they will attract a more risky class of borrowers.
Consequently, banks have to increase the lending rate premium charged (De Bondt,
2002).
In contrast to e.g. Weth (2002), using panel data from a bank survey, I will examine
aggregate relationships between time series of policy-controlled interest rates and the
bank lending rate on short-term commercial loans. Thereby, I will focus on the following
four aspects.
First, the response of lending rates may depend on whether or not policy-controlled
rates are rising. If credit demand is inelastic in the short term, revenue for the bank is
temporarily foregone when rates are lowered but gained when they are raised (see Borio
and Fritz, 1995, also for additional explanations). So the pass-through of reﬁnancing cost
changes on lending rates may be delayed in periods of falling interest rates. However,
1Borio and Fritz (1995) ﬁnd no evidence for this kind of asymmetry, whereas Sander and
Kleimeier (2002) do for a few European countries.
Second, money market rates might have become less noisy and volatile since the
implementation of the European Monetary Union compared to the individual countries
before. If this is the case, it would have become easier for banks to identify permanent
changes in interest rates (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1995) which should speed up the interest
rate transmission process (Mojon, 2000).
Third, results for Austria are scarce and conﬂicting. A study of the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements from 1994 reports a long-term pass-through of a change in the money
market rate on the short-term commercial lending rate of 68 % for the period from 1984
to 1994 (cited in De Bondt, 2002, Table 1). Using data from 1995 to 2000, Donnay and
Degryse (2001, Table 3) estimate that 18 % of a change in the money market rate are dis-
seminated after 12 months. This appears to be low, although there are Austrian speciﬁcs
that could account for such a result. Loans represent by far the most important source
for external funding of Austrian ﬁrms and this dependance might delay transmission if
interest rates go down. Additionally, the Austrian banking sector is dominated by credit
cooperatives and savings banks being not primarily interested in short-term proﬁts. Their
goal is to ensure a stable value of their assets over the long term and to provide constant
credit to their clients. Close relationship banking has the additional advantage of reduc-
ing asymmetric information (Braumann, 2002). Intertemporal interest-rate smoothing is
likely to occur and banks which are heavily involved in long-term business with non-banks
adjust their lending rates comparatively slowly (Weth, 2002). The Austrian interest rate
transmission process obtained further prominence when, in 2002, the EU Commission
convicted seven large Austrian banks for not passing on interest rate decreases to their
customers for several times and imposed a ﬁne on them (approx. 124 million Euro)1.
Fourth, the methodological approach is slightly diﬀerent from the one used in almost
all other time-series applications. The structural model is less restrictive than the bivariate
vector autoregression which often is applied. Furthermore, I do not use an error-correction
model right from the beginning as I presume interest rates to be near-integrated time
series. Therefore, cointegration relations between them might not be present and an
error-correction model might not be the most proper approach.
2 Data and methodological framework
I use Austrian data on several interest rates to investigate transmission dynamics: the rate
on reﬁnancing operations controlled by the Central Bank, the 3-month interbank (money
market) rate, the interest rate on newly granted short-term loans to private enterprises,
and the secondary market return on bonds issued by private non-banking institutions.
I will refer to these nominal interest rates as policy, interbank and lending rate as well
as bond yield in the following. Additional determinants of interest rate movements, the
inﬂation rate and commercial credit growth, complete the data set. The sample starts
in March 1995 and ends in December 2002. The appendix provides a more detailed
1The“interest rate cartel”(also called“Lombard-Club”) was in place between 1995 and 1998. The banks
involved have argued that they did agree on delays in the pass-through of key interest rate changes, but
that none of them sticked to the arrangements.
2description of all the monthly time series. Table 1 presents summary statistics and Figure
1 graphs the policy, the interbank and the lending rate. It becomes evident that the policy
and the interbank rate are slightly more volatile after 1998. The spread between them
and the bank lending rate narrowed in time as the latter experienced a strong movement
downwards in the late 1990s.
As can be seen from the selection of the time series, I allow for both a money market
and an administered policy rate in determining the lending rate. The money market
rate is mostly seen as the key opportunity cost of the lending decision as it represents
the cost of funds or the revenue foregone by extending a loan (Borio and Fritz, 1995).
The choice of money market rates to represent monetary policy is motivated by the
discontinuity and inaccuracy in policy rate series as the instruments of monetary policy
may change during the sample period. Moreover, most of the time, policy is conducted
by means of a combination of instruments that would be poorly represented by the sole
policy rate. Therefore, the money market rate seems to be the most appropriate measure
of monetary policy since it is most correlated with Central Bank policies as a whole
(Donnay and Degryse, 2001). The arguments in favor of additionally considering the
reﬁnancing operations interest rate are that it can be used to underline the persistence
of a speciﬁc policy move and thus helps to crystallize expectations about future interest
rates. When money market rates are particularly volatile, it may be a better indicator of
their persistent, rather than purely transitory, movements (Borio and Fritz, 1995).
None of the series contains seasonal unit roots according to HEGY tests for monthly
time series (Franses and Hobijn, 1997), but seasonal dummies seem to be needed to
adequately model commercial credit growth. The unit root tests applied are Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), KPSS (Kwiatowski et al., 1992) and ERS (Elliott
et al., 1996) tests. Test results suggest that none of the time series is integrated of an
order higher than one. As univariate unit root tests often report diﬀerent results on
whether a series is stationary or integrated of order one and most of the tests have severe
shortcomings (low power, above all), I will test for stationarity in the multivariate context
later on.
I treat all selected variables as endogenous and assume that their data-generating
process can be reasonably well approximated by a ﬁnite vector autoregression (VAR) of
order p (see e.g. Hamilton, 1994, chapter 11 or, for a short but comprehensive discussion,
L¨ utkepohl, 1999). The structural VAR for a vector X of n random variables is given by
B0Xt = ¹s +
p X
i=1
BiXt¡i + CZ + ²t; (1)
where B0 is the matrix of contemporaneous relations between the variables and the re-
maining B’s and C are (n £ n) parameter matrices. The vector Z may contain seasonal
dummies, exogenous variables or a linear time trend. The structural errors ²t are assumed
to be instantaneously uncorrelated. Multiplying (1) by B
¡1
0 leads to the reduced form of
the VAR
Xt = ¹ +
p X
i=1
ΦiXt¡i + DZ + et; (2)
3where the disturbance term et is an independent white noise process, et » N(0;Σ). The
reduced-form errors are contemporaneously correlated, so their covariance matrix Σ is
a non-diagonal matrix (which also is non-singular, positive-deﬁnite and time-invariant).
The vector error-correction representation (VEC), omitting the term for seasonal dummies
and exogenous variables, is
∆Xt = ¹ + ΠXt¡1 +
p¡1 X
i=1
Γi∆Xt¡i + et; (3)
which is to be used with cointegration tests and contains only stationary terms if none of
the variables is integrated of an order higher than one. If Π has reduced rank, there exists
a decomposition Π = ®¯0 with ® and ¯ being (n £ r) matrices. The columns of ¯ are to
be interpreted as stable long-term (cointegrating) relations between the non-diﬀerenced
series and ¯0Xt¡1 is called the equilibrium error. The Γ’s are (n£n) parameter matrices.
3 VAR order selection and cointegration tests
For VAR lag order selection I apply several procedures. The prespeciﬁed maximum is 6
lags. Sequential LR tests suggest either 6 or 2 lags. The Akaike Information criterion
favors 6 lags, the Hannan-Quinn and the Schwarz criterion suggest either 1 or 6 as, with
increasing order, their respective values exhibit a hump shape. LM-type autocorrelation
tests based on the full reduced-form residual vectors (see Johansen, 1995, p. 22) and
multivariate normality tests (Mardia, 1980) suggest “well-behaved” residuals for a lag
order of 2 or higher. I chose the VAR order to be equal to 2.
With cointegration tests, I search for linear combinations of the variables that are
stationary. Because I presume that some of the series might be trend-stationary, I allow
for a linear time trend that is restricted to lie within the cointegration space. So, in fact,
∆Xt = ¹ + ®(¯
0Xt¡1 + ±1 + ±2t) +
p¡1 X
i=1
Γi∆Xt¡i + et (4)
is estimated. Testing how many linearly independent stationary relations r there are
between the variables in Xt is equivalent to test how many eigenvalues (¸) of ®¯0 = Π are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. For the tests I use the trace statistic, but as the sample
size is relatively small, I apply its corrected version (Reimers, 1992)
LR(r) = ¡(T ¡ np)
n X
i=r+1
log(1 ¡ ˆ ¸i): (5)
The particular null hypothesis is that the number of distinct cointegrating vectors is less
than or equal to r, the sequential testing procedure starts with H0: r = 0. Critical values
have to be simulated in presence of dummy variables (Johansen and Nielsen, 1993). Table
42 shows the corrected trace statistic and the simulated critical value for every possible r
as well as the eigenvalues of Π. The test results lead to conclude that Π has full rank,
so the vector process Xt is stationary. In the following, I therefore estimate equation (2)
including a linear time trend in Z.
4 Granger-causality results
The VAR can be estimated by OLS, using two lags of each endogenous variable in each
equation. Because of some problems with serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in
single equations, Newey-West standard errors were calculated which take account for
serial correlation up to order 12. Granger-causality is investigated by testing whether
or not the coeﬃcients of a variable’s lags jointly are equal to zero. P-values for the
corresponding F-statistics are reported in Table 3.
It is past information on policy rates that is found to be predictive for current
bank lending rates. Nevertheless, there seems to be a transient reversal or correction
in the interest rate transmission process as the ﬁrst lag of the policy rate is negatively
signiﬁcant in the lending rate equation at the 5 % level. Dissemination of policy rate
changes continues afterwards if the latter prove to be permanent. Given the information
on past policy rate changes, the lags of the interbank rate do not provide an additional
source for improving bank lending rate forecasts.
The fact that past inﬂation and credit growth changes are not strongly reﬂected in
lending rates is indicative in favor of the housebank principle typical for Austria. Granger-
causal for credit growth are the inﬂation rate as well as almost all interest rates (inﬂation
leads the growth rate of commercial credit positively, the lending rate negatively).
Other interesting results, which are not directly related to the central question of
interest rate transmission, emerge as well. For example, interest rates fail to Granger-
cause the inﬂation rate. Policy-orientated interest rates could have been supposed to be
a leading indicator for the inﬂation rate because of reverse causality (if expected inﬂation
rises, interest rates move). Such an indicator eﬀect is counteracted by interest rate changes
actually lowering inﬂation. Also past credit growth cannot be used to obtain improved
forecasts for the inﬂation rate and secondary market returns of private sector bonds cannot
be predicted by lagged values of other interest rates and credit growth. Rising policy rates
are forecasted by prior increases in credit growth and the interbank rate, but the policy
rate is not led by past information on inﬂation.
5 Innovation accounting results
The next goal is to simulate the dynamic impact of unexpected exogenous “shocks” (or
“innovations”) onto the variables in the system, especially onto the lending rate and credit
growth. If the VAR is stable, there exists an equivalent MA(1) representation




The reduced form errors et are orthogonalized to obtain estimates of ²t via B0et = ²t.
5Because the components in et are not instantaneously uncorrelated, shocks could not be
isolated from each other if they were represented by unexpected changes of the reduced-
form residuals. B0 is to be estimated and the µi matrices contain the so-called impulse-
response functions.
I identify the structural errors by restricting the contemporaneous relations between
the variables in B0 via a Cholesky decomposition of Σ. With this, B0 is forced to be a lower
triangular matrix. This means that the variable ordered ﬁrst is not contemporaneously
inﬂuenced by all the others in the system, only the ﬁrst variable has an instantaneous
eﬀect on the second, and so on. The ordering of the variables therefore is crucial in this
setting. Contemporaneous feedback relations cannot be accounted for with a Cholesky
decomposition, a recursive structure in form of a causal chain is imposed2. A diﬀerent
ordering would result in a diﬀerent decomposition of Σ, diﬀerent structural shocks and
therefore diﬀerent responses.
The causal chain I implemented is as follows: The inﬂation rate is assumed to be
contemporaneously exogenous and ordered ﬁrst, followed by the policy rate, the interbank
rate, the bond yield and the lending rate. Credit growth is put last and therefore is
restricted to not instantaneously inﬂuence any of the other variables. What I do not allow
for is, for example, an impact of the interbank rate, the lending rate or credit growth on
the policy interest rate within a month. I tried diﬀerent plausible orderings to check the
robustness of the impulse-response functions, but the applied one seems to be the most
reasonable and acceptable “semi-structural” identiﬁcation scheme. The structural errors
are shocked by one unit in the following what amounts to 1-percentage-point shocks.
Standard errors and 95 % conﬁdence bands for all innovation accounting estimates are
bootstrapped according to Runkle (1987) with 2000 replications.
The columns of Table 4 report contemporaneous (within-month) eﬀects of a one-
percentage-point shock in one variable on the others. Such a shock in the inﬂation rate, for
example, leads to an increase in the lending rate of 0.08 percentage points within the same
month. The instantaneous response of the bank lending rate to an unanticipated policy
rate increase is 0.31 percentage points, whereas the comparable response to innovations
in the interbank rate is smaller and not quite signiﬁcant at the 5 % level. Lending rate
responses will be more deeply investigated in the next two sections.
Some results from the impulse-response functions for a horizon of twelve months
are the following: The bond yield (positively) responds to shocks in the policy and the
interbank rate, but not to shocks in the inﬂation rate. Also the eﬀects of shocks in
the inﬂation rate onto the lending rate remain small over the year following the shock.
There are no signiﬁcant direct responses of credit growth due to shocks in the policy rate.
But following an innovation in the interbank rate, credit growth signiﬁcantly declines in
periods t and t+1. Responses of credit growth to structural shocks in the lending rate are
signiﬁcantly negative and accumulate to approx. 6 percentage points over the 12-month
horizon. The lending rate reacts to shocks in the bond yield in the medium run, but
credit growth does not. So also the fact that bond issues cannot be taken seriously as a
substitute for loans in Austrian corporate ﬁnance is represented in my results.
2A more appropriate identiﬁcation rule can be deﬁned by allowing free parameters above the diagonal
of B0 with the appropriate number of restrictions maintained at the same time. All attempts to provide
more economic structure (for example, to allow feedback between most of the interest rates) resulted in
ill-mannered log-likelihood functions of the respective structural VAR, also with diﬀerent starting values.
66 Lending rate responses
The response and the accumulated response of the lending rate following a 1-percentage-
point innovation in the interbank rate can be found in Figure 2 together with 95 %
conﬁdence bands. The shock is fully disseminated and its transmission is completed after
6 months. A more detailed investigation of lending rate responses needs to address the
following questions:
² Does the bank lending rate respond faster and more strongly to innovations in the
policy or the interbank rate?
² Is transmission faster if policy-determined rates increase than if they decrease?
² Descriptive statistics (see Table 1) and Figure 1 show that, on average, the diﬀerence
between the bank lending rate and the policy as well as the interbank rate fell sharply
after 1998. But have patterns in interest rate transmission also changed since the
European Monetary Union is in place?
To analyze these questions, I identify the following cases: The interest rate to be shocked
(policy or interbank rate) increases, decreases or changes in one of these directions after
19983. The cases are represented by dummy variables and interaction terms. For example,
for the case “the policy rate goes up” the VAR additionally contains a dummy variable
(and two lags of it) that takes the value 1 if the policy rate has risen compared to the
month before, as well as two lags of an interaction of this dummy with the policy rate.
Only accumulated responses are discussed at this stage. The cases and the appendant
results appear in diﬀerent columns of Table 5, where columns [1] contain the estimates
from the initial speciﬁcation.
The diﬀerent adjustment patterns indicate that, also in Austria, the lending rate
sluggishly responds to changes in policy-controlled interest rates. An important ﬁnding is
that there is a strong asymmetry in the transmission of policy rate innovations in the short
term. After three months, 62 % of the shock are passed on to the bank lending rate in case
of a rising policy rate, whereas after a decline the accumulated lending rate adjustment
after three months is comparably low. From 1999 on, however, these diﬀerences in the
short-term propagation of policy rate shocks declined. Responses of the bank lending
rate to shocks in the interbank rate also prove to be asymmetric, but only in the longer
term. In case of a falling interbank rate, transmission even stops about a half year after
the shock (see the corresponding column [4] in Table 5). A long-term asymmetry also
emerges for policy rate shock transmission. Decreases in the policy rate are more quickly
passed on to bank lending rates after 1998. Accumulated responses for months 6 and 7
after the shock are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (see column [5] for shocks to the policy
rate in Table 5).
3The fact that there are no data on commercial lending rates before 1995 complicates the interpretation
of the results because for the whole pre-EMU period applicable here the so-called“Lombard-Club”was in
place. So if my results show that interest rate transmission in Austria became faster from 1999 on, this
might also partly be due to the breakup of interest rate arrangements between large Austrian banks.
77 Conclusions
This study conﬁrms and complements previous empirical ﬁndings on interest rate trans-
mission with the result that there is considerable short-term stickiness of retail bank lend-
ing rates also in Austria. The maximum instantaneous lending rate adjustment is found
in case of increases in the administered policy rate of which 32 % are passed through
within one month. In this regard, there hardly is a diﬀerence to the European-level point
estimate of De Bondt (2002).
Additionally, the interest rate transmission process in Austria is asymmetric as the
adjustment paths of the lending rate diﬀer markedly subject to the direction of changes
in policy and money market rates. Not in every case the ﬁnal adjustment of the interest
rate on short-term commercial loans is complete.
Institutional changes, in particular the implementation of the European Monetary
Union (EMU), had signiﬁcant eﬀects on the interest rate pass-through process. But a
quicker transmission, as suggested by Mojon (2000) and De Bondt (2002), is not uniformly
supported by the Austrian data. Lending rate adjustment especially is stronger (faster)
following decreases in the policy rate after 1998, but is weaker (slower) in case of rising
interbank and policy rates within the EMU-period.
All the results for lending rate responses suggest that a shift in the relative im-
portance of interest rate innovations for retail bank lending rates seems to have taken
place in the last years. The increasingly relevant determinant (or leading indicator) for
commercial credit interest rates in recent times is the policy rate. This matches well with
the observation that changes in key interest rates are more publicly recognized and de-
bated since the European Central Bank is responsible for monetary policy. But also the
economic climate at times of the interest rate decreases after September, 11, 2001 might
partly be responsible for the stronger and faster transmission found to happen if policy
rates go down after 1998.
Future research may deal with determinants of the transmission process that are not
covered here explicitly or assumed to be constant. These factors comprise the state of the
economy in an interest rate or business cycle, shifts in the demand for and the riskiness
of loans as well as changes in the banks’ markups.
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Notes: The ﬁgure reports responses and accumulated responses (in percentage points) for the 12 months
following the shock. Dashed lines display the appendant 95 % conﬁdence intervals. The graphs also include
the within-month adjustment of the lending rate (period 0).
10Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Standard error Minimum Maximum
Full sample period: March 1995 - December 2002
Inﬂation rate 1.69 0.77 0.20 3.27
Policy rate 3.49 0.66 2.50 4.81
Interbank rate 3.72 0.62 2.58 5.09
Bond yield 5.34 0.79 3.53 7.19
Lending rate 6.58 0.79 5.41 8.72
Credit growth 0.39 1.00 -2.83 3.69
Lending rate - policy rate 3.09 0.70 1.92 4.36
Lending rate - interbank rate 2.86 0.66 1.79 4.26
Subperiod 1: March 1995 - December 1998
Inﬂation rate 1.54 0.59 0.64 2.73
Policy rate 3.38 0.51 3.00 4.69
Interbank rate 3.70 0.46 3.21 5.01
Bond yield 5.96 0.43 5.26 7.19
Lending rate 7.09 0.73 6.12 8.72
Credit growth 0.47 1.04 -2.83 2.24
Lending rate - policy rate 3.71 0.37 3.04 4.36
Lending rate - interbank rate 3.39 0.49 2.64 4.26
Subperiod 2: January 1999 - December 2002
Inﬂation rate 1.83 0.89 0.20 3.27
Policy rate 3.58 0.77 2.50 4.81
Interbank rate 3.73 0.75 2.58 5.09
Bond yield 4.75 0.59 3.53 5.80
Lending rate 6.09 0.47 5.41 6.99
Credit growth 0.30 0.96 -2.22 3.69
Lending rate - policy rate 2.50 0.35 1.92 3.13
Lending rate - interbank rate 2.35 0.32 1.79 2.89
11Table 2: Cointegration rank test results.
r Corrected trace statistic Simulated critical value Eigenvalue
0 296.12 97.41 0.7656
1 179.68 72.52 0.5969
2 106.76 51.20 0.4488
3 58.95 32.89 0.3319
4 26.58 18.19 0.1793
5 10.72 5.91 0.1251
Notes: The testing procedure is sequential, starting with H0: r = 0. If the null hypothesis is
rejected, the next step is a test of H0: r · 1, and so on.
Table 3: Granger-causality test results.
Inﬂation Policy Interbank Bond Lending Credit
Equation of rate rate rate yield rate growth
Inﬂation rate 0.286 0.392 0.505 0.830 0.125 0.828
Policy rate 0.892 0.012 0.012 0.109 0.087 0.017
Interbank rate 0.455 0.558 0.000 0.018 0.348 0.915
Bond yield 0.809 0.626 0.930 0.000 0.781 0.305
Lending rate 0.232 0.002 0.168 0.000 0.000 0.759
Credit growth 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.195 0.000 0.009
Notes: Granger-causality is examined by testing whether the coeﬃcients of both lags of a variable jointly are zero
in a particular equation. The table reports p-values for the according F-statistic. The rows of the table illustrate
the test results equation by equation, the columns show the test results for the variable in the header.
12Table 4: Within-month responses.
Within-month Inﬂation Policy Interbank Bond Lending
response of rate rate rate yield rate
Inﬂation rate
Policy rate 0.03
Interbank rate 0.02 0.78 *
Bond yield 0.04 0.83 * 0.43 *
Lending rate 0.08 * 0.31 * 0.10 -0.04
Credit growth 0.59 * -0.16 -1.08 * 0.58 * -0.91
Notes: Each row of the table reports by how much a variable responds to 1-percentage-point shocks in
the column-heading series within one month. There is no table entry for responses to own shocks and
if the response is restricted to be zero in the identiﬁcation scheme of the structural shocks. Responses
marked with an asterisk are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5 % level.
Table 5: Accumulated responses of the bank lending rate.
Policy rate Interbank rate
Step [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
0 0.31 * 0.32 * 0.30 * 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.20 * 0.11 0.18 * 0.12
1 0.43 * 0.43 * 0.37 * -0.02 0.09 0.33 * 0.49 * 0.28 * 0.48 * 0.29 *
2 0.66 * 0.62 * 0.52 * 0.05 0.23 0.50 * 0.66 * 0.39 0.63 * 0.40
3 0.88 * 0.73 0.61 0.15 0.37 0.67 * 0.81 * 0.53 0.73 * 0.51
4 1.09 * 0.84 0.71 0.29 0.56 0.82 * 0.96 * 0.67 0.78 * 0.61
5 1.26 * 0.91 0.78 0.43 0.75 0.94 * 1.08 * 0.79 0.78 0.68
6 1.39 * 0.95 0.83 0.56 0.93 * 1.03 * 1.19 * 0.89 0.76 0.73
7 1.48 * 0.96 0.86 0.69 1.11 * 1.07 * 1.28 * 0.98 0.71 0.75
8 1.53 * 0.97 0.88 0.81 1.26 1.08 * 1.34 * 1.04 0.65 0.76
9 1.54 0.97 0.89 0.92 1.40 1.06 * 1.39 * 1.08 0.58 0.74
10 1.53 0.96 0.90 1.02 1.51 1.01 * 1.43 * 1.11 0.51 0.73
11 1.49 0.95 0.90 1.09 1.61 0.96 1.47 * 1.12 0.44 0.71
12 1.45 0.95 0.90 1.15 1.68 0.89 1.49 * 1.13 0.39 0.69
Notes: The table reports accumulated responses of the lending rate to a 1-percentage-point shock in either the policy or
the interbank rate for various subsequent months (steps). The table entries for step 0 refer to responses within the month
the shock occured. Responses marked with an asterisk are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5 % level.
For both policy and interbank rate shocks there are ﬁve cases. Column [1] tabulates the initial estimates. For the scenarios
tabulated in columns [2] to [5], the VAR includes lagged interaction terms and contemporaneous as well as lagged shift
dummies for the following events concerning the respective shocked interest rate in time period t: [2] Increase, [3] Increase
after 1998, [4] Decrease, [5] Decrease after 1998.
13B Description of the data
Denotation Description and source
Inﬂation rate Inﬂation rate in %, growth rate of a chained consumer price index (CPI, base year
2000) relative to the value of this CPI a year before. Source of the CPI: Statistik
Austria.
Policy rate March 1995 - December 1995: Short-term open-market operations interest rate.
Source: Austrian Central Bank (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, OeNB). January
1996 - December 1998: Interest rate on open-market tenders. Source: OeNB.
January 1999 - December 2002: Main reﬁnancing operations rate (ﬁxed rate up
to the end of June 2000, average rate of variable rate tenders after June 2000).
Source: European Central Bank (ECB).
Interbank rate March 1995 - December 1998: 3 month Vienna interbank oﬀered rate. Source:
OeNB. January 1999 - December 2002: 3 month Euro interbank oﬀered rate (Eu-
ribor). Source: ECB.
Bond yield Secondary market return on listed bonds issued by Austrian non-banking institu-
tions (excluding bonds issued by the public sector) with a ﬁxed interest rate and
more than one year remaining to maturity. Source: OeNB.
Lending rate Short-term commercial credit rate (average interest rate on new short-term loans
to enterprises reported by a sample of 41 Monetary Financial Institutions). Source:
OeNB.
Credit growth Growth rate of commercial credit (outstanding accounts of domestic non-bank and
non-ﬁnancial enterprises). Source: OeNB.
The sample starts in March 1995 and ends in December 2002. Interest rates and commercial credit are
in nominal terms.
Dummy variables represent the following events: The deﬁnition of the commercial credit series was altered
at the end of 1995; European level interest rates replace some of the national rates from January 1999
on; the basket of goods and services of the Austrian CPI changed in January 1996 and 2000; in July 2000
the ECB shifted from ﬁxed rate to variable rate tenders in reﬁnancing operations.
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